From time to time I've blogged the work of Andrew Bacevich, a former soldier who is now a professor at Boston University. I become aware of him when he published The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War. I highly recommend this book.
Prof. Bacevich recently published an article that contains several trenchant paragraphs on the surge in Iraq. It's true, he says, that there has been some reduction in the violence, but the desired political reconciliation hasn't come to pass:
Unfortunately, partial success in reducing the level of violence has not translated into any substantial political gains. Recall that the purpose of the surge was not to win the war in a military sense. Gen. David Petraeus never promised victory. He and any number of other senior officers have assessed the war as militarily unwinnable. On this point, the architects of the surge were quite clear: the object of the exercise was not to impose our will on the enemy but to facilitate political reconciliation among Iraqis.
A year later, signs of genuine reconciliation are few. In an interview with the Washington Post less than a month ago, General Petraeus said that "no one" in the U.S. government "feels that there has been sufficient progress by any means in the area of national reconciliation." While it may be nice that the Kurds have begun to display the Iraqi flag alongside their own, to depict such grudging concessions as evidence of an emerging national identity is surely to grasp at straws.
So although the level of violence has subsided somewhat, the war remains essentially stalemated. Iraq today qualifies only nominally as a sovereign nation-state. It has become a dependency of the United States, unable to manage its own affairs or to provide for the well-being of its own people. As recent events in Basra have affirmed, the Iraqi army, a black hole into which the Pentagon has poured some $22 billion in aid and assistance, still cannot hold its own against armed militias.
What are the costs of our continuing involvement? What are the benefits?
The costs to the United States of sustaining this dependency are difficult to calculate with precision, but figures such as $3 billion per week and 30 to 40 American lives per month provide a good approximation.
What can we expect to gain in return for this investment? The Bush administration was counting on the Iraq War to demonstrate the viability of its Freedom Agenda and to affirm the efficacy of the Bush Doctrine of preventive war.
Measured in those terms, the war has long since failed. Rather than showcasing our ability to transform the Greater Middle East, Operation Iraqi Freedom has demonstrated just the opposite. Using military power as an instrument for imprinting liberal values in this part of the world has produced a failed state while fostering widespread antipathy toward the United States.
Rather than demonstrating our ability to eliminate emerging threats swiftly, decisively, and economicallySaddam Hussein’s removal providing an object lesson to other tyrants tempted to contest our presence in the Middle Eastthe Iraq War has revealed the limits of U.S. power and called into question American competence. The Bush Doctrine hasn't worked. Saddam is long gone, but we're stuck. Rather than delivering decisive victory, preventive war has landed us in a quagmire.
The abject failure of the Freedom Agenda and the Bush Doctrine has robbed the Iraq War of any strategic rationale. The war continues in large part because of our refusal to acknowledge and confront this loss of strategic purpose.
Well, according to Prof. Bacevich, there are, it seems, no benefits to our current policy.
If you look at this slightly older article, you'll find him arguing cogently that our foreign policy is no longer buttressed by a coherent set of principles for the use of military force.
At the very end of the article about the surge, you'll see that Prof. Bacevich is about to publish a new book entitled The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism. I moused around a bit but couldn't find a publisher's webpage for the book. So, for the time being, you'll have to make do with the Amazon page. Presumably, Prof. Bacevich's new book will address the question of the principles that should guide our use of military force.